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GARY SHAPIRO 
Hegel's Dialectic of Artistic Meaning 
I. ARTISTIC MEANING: INTENTION 
OR INTERPRETATION? 
WHATEVER ELSE they are, works of art are 
intentional human products. Our responses 
to such works are understandings and inter- 
pretations. That the works are or may be 
physical objects, cultural symptoms, or com- 
modities and that audiences may be shocked, 
sexually excited, or politically instructed 
are irrelevant to the cognitive poles of in- 
tention and interpretation; these make art 
philosophically significant and differentiate 
it from that which has no meaning, despite 
possible similarities in apparent structure 
or emotional effect. Cognitivist theories of 
art usually tend to focus rather exclusively 
on just one of the two poles which char- 
acterize art so conceived - the artist's in- 
tention or the interpretation given by audi- 
ence or critics. Philosophers with idealistic 
commitments have often argued, as do 
Croce and Collingwood, that the artist's 
experience, understood as a unique expres- 
sion, is not merely the meaning of the work 
of art, but the work itself. New Critics ob- 
ject to any reference to the artist's inten- 
tions as tending to distort the sense of "the 
text itself." The structure of disputes in 
aesthetics, to a large extent, consists either of 
conflicts within these tendencies or between 
them.1 So intentionalists may very well dis- 
agree as to whether intentions are general 
or unique, conscious or unconscious. Those 
who reject intentionalism but retain a cog- 
nitive conception of interpretation may dis- 
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agree as to the proper criteria of interpre- 
tation and the degree to which a work 
admits multiple significations. These family 
quarrels can sometimes be shelved for po- 
lemics against the "intentional fallacy" or 
for charges that a work sundered from its 
author's intention must be radically am- 
biguous. Such disputes can lead to rather 
extreme and uncomfortable claims. One 
such extreme holds that the meaning of a 
work is simply identical with the author's 
intention, the audience's role being simply 
to identify themselves with the artist's 
thought. The complement of this view is 
that which takes as paradigms of art those 
independently existing works which encour- 
age us to discover a multiplicity of mean- 
ings, interpretations, and possibilities. The 
choice between individual solitary expres- 
sion or a celebration of ambiguities is not a 
happy one. 
One way of dealing with the appar- 
ently deep inconsistency of these approaches 
is to adopt an empirical point of view which 
rejects the exclusive validity of either tend- 
ency. It may be suggested, quite plausibly, 
that works vary in the extent to which their 
makers have authority over their meaning 
or in the degree to which their texture or 
structure is open and consequently admits 
a variety of interpretations. I believe that 
this fact offers only a partial solution to the 
dilemmas posed above. For intentions and 
interpretations seem to play a fundamental 
role in art which tempt us to seek some in- 
telligible connection between them. If it 
is a fact that works of different styles, artists, 
or periods may be found which exemplify 
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one or the other of the theories discussed 
above, the task for aesthetics should be to 
exhibit this as a reasoned fact. 
It is an interesting and (as far as I can 
tell) little-noticed virtue of Hegel's discus- 
sion of art in the Phenomenology of Mind 
that it aims at such a reasoned account of 
the roles of intention and interpretation in 
art. In brief, Hegel recognizes that insofar 
as it is cognitive, art revolves around these 
two poles. Rather than focus on one of 
these to the exclusion of the other, however, 
Hegel tells a story, or more accurately, ra- 
tionally reconstructs the philosophical his- 
tory of art. The story has a place for the 
happy moment of union between the artist 
and his audience, for the confusion of 
variant meanings guessed into a work by a 
public alienated from the producer, and 
for a variety of intermediate stages. The 
key to the story is Hegel's view that the 
kinds of questions raised about artistic 
meaning are not simply external to art, 
and therefore limited to the discipline of 
philosophical aesthetics. He suggests that 
art itself involves the tendency to become 
aware of the problems which arise from the 
gap between intention and interpretation; 
with this awareness it searches for a solution 
having the form of an identity of artist's and 
audience's meaning through the medium 
of the work. While one-sided theories tend 
to enshrine the identity or ambiguity de- 
tected in a particular artistic phase, Hegel 
suggests a rational historical analysis which 
demonstrates their interconnection. 
Before examining the details of this ideal 
story as Hegel tells it in his chapter on 
"The Religion of Art" (Kunstreligion), 
some clarifications may be useful. First, I 
will treat Hegel's discussion somewhat selec- 
tively, dealing with those elements in it 
which are related to questions of artistic 
meaning. Second, there is an apparent 
problem posed by Hegel's limitation of his 
analysis to classical Greek art with a reli- 
gious interest. The ensuing discussion will 
show that Hegel was largely correct in 
thinking that the attitudes of Greek artists 
and audiences have quasi-universal signifi- 
cance. In the meantime these points should 
be kept in mind, which will be confirmed 
by what follows: Hegel's reconstruction of 
Greek art is only apparently chronological; 
its true order is a logical sequence of in- 
creasingly adequate attempts to realize a 
purpose. This is, of course, the pattern of 
Hegel's Phenomenology and to some extent 
of his entire system; chronological order 
tends to but does not exactly coincide with 
teleological order. That the art in question 
is religious should not appear strange when 
we recall that for Hegel religion is a figura- 
tive way of attaining self-knowledge. In fact 
the particular development with which we 
will be concerned shows a progress from the 
naive religious consciousness which takes 
the gods to be independent subjects to the 
more philosophical awareness that our 
thought about the gods is a form of reflec- 
tion on ourselves. 
Like some other writers on aesthetics 
Hegel begins by distinguishing the artist 
from the craftsman or artisan. The artisan 
who produces symbolic objects with abstract 
form (such as pyramids and obelisks) is like 
the artist insofar as what he produces serves 
no obvious external purpose, as do the 
products of the cook or the carpenter. Yet 
he differs from the artist because he acts 
more instinctively and mechanically than 
the latter. Where the artisan simply follows 
a pattern without much thought, the artist 
constructs or invents a pattern. In Platonic 
terms, it is not that the artisan is closer to 
the form of the bed than the painter; it is 
rather that the artistically painted bed is 
the imaginative construction of a bed ratlher 
than the slavish imitation of a pattern. 
Despite some apparent similarities, Hegel's 
contrast of artist and craftsman also differs 
in some respects from that which Colling- 
wood has made current. For Collingwood 
the artist is free from the mechanical im- 
position of form on matter only to the ex- 
tent to which he expresses an absolutely 
unique emotion, disregarding all concepts 
and ideas which might govern his product.2 
According to Hegel, the artist is a kind of 
conceptual thinker; he does have a speci- 
fiable aim, as does the craftsman, but his 
aim is reflectively chosen. His activity is 
not invariably determined by his concepts; 
but this is because his concepts are subject 
24 
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to progressive clarification and determina- 
tion, not because he escapes the conceptual 
for the emotional. 
Much is built into Hegel's original char- 
acterization of the artist. His activity is said 
to be intentional and self-conscious; he is 
beyond the world of feeling and emotion 
which both expressionist theory and popu- 
lar opinion tend to confuse with art, just 
as he is distinct from the unreflective crafts- 
man. As an artist he is already a kind of 
thinker; so Hegel might suggest that all art 
is "conceptual art," genuine art being con- 
stituted by intentional activity capable of 
reflective modification. What will such an 
artist aim at doing? Hegel suggests that he 
will attempt to depict the gods, and we 
are immediately tempted to think that he 
is either guilty of a false generalization from 
the Greek experience or that he has illegiti- 
mately imposed his own belief that all ra- 
tional activity aims at knowledge of the 
divine (or Absolute) on the great variety 
of artistic modes and styles. Whether the 
divine is the ultimate subject of all judg- 
ment is indeed a large question; by dis- 
cussing Hegel's attempt to articulate this 
insight in his treatment of art, it may ap- 
pear surprisingly plausible and subtle. If 
we recall that the gods are to a large extent 
alienated and externalized visions of our- 
selves, Hegel's point becomes a bit clearer. 
The artist is a self-conscious being, no 
longer content with a life which would con- 
sist only of instinctual and social routines. 
He will be most true to himself wlien he 
attempts to manifest or express his self- 
consciousness. But why should the gods 
be the necessary medium for such self- 
expression? According to Hegel they will 
not always be necessary - not even, as we 
shall see, in art-religion - but they do 
represent the logically simplest form in 
which the artist's self-knowledge will take 
shape. And the activity of this simplest 
form exhibits our tendency to recognize 
human traits elsewhere before we recognize 
them in ourselves. The artist has to learn 
self-expression, just as children learn to ar- 
ticulate their own states of mind by com- 
menting on the (projected or actual) mental 
life of others (including such surrogates as 
25 
animals and dolls). Hegel's reconstruction 
of the phases of artistic activity attempts to 
exhibit the ideal order of such self-education. 
Coincidentally it will become clear why the 
artist's self-education will involve the estab- 
lishment of an artistic meaning accessible 
to himself and his audience.3 
II. FROM ABSTRACT SEPARATION 
TO COMIC IDENTITY 
A. The abstract work of art. 
The simplest artist (already far removed 
from the craftsman by his self-consciousness) 
aims at exhibiting the features of the gods. 
Now although he will tend to presuppose 
that the gods are distinct from himself and 
his audience, the artist must embody their 
ideal self-consciousness; and the only forms 
of such embodiment with which he is fa- 
miliar are the human manifestations of self- 
consciousness. So the initial result of repre- 
senting the gods in a plastic medium will 
be, typically, the statue of an idealized 
human being. Here the point is not that 
sculpture is the first art-form to arise in a 
historical sequence, but that a static, non- 
verbal representation will be the most 
primitive means of realizing art's purpose. 
However, as soon as the artist reflects on 
his achievement, he is struck by its inade- 
quacy. The inadequacy which the artist de- 
tects in his own work is the vast discrepancy 
between the object - e.g. the sculpture-- 
and that which it is meant to represent or 
embody. Hegel draws attention to the dif- 
ference by saying that such works of art 
are "abstract"; they are not living or self- 
conscious either in the way that their puta- 
tive object is or, more significantly, in the 
way that their creators and audience are. 
The failure of abstract art lies in its separa- 
tion of artist, art-work, and audience. Struc- 
turally the defect of such art is that for 
either the artist or the audience, an experi- 
ence of this actually triadic situation tends 
to be dyadic. The audience sees some mean- 
ing in the work but attempts to understand 
the work as an independent object. Such 
understanding is necessarily indefinite and 
indeterminate, for there can be no meaning 
without purpose or intention, and by neg- 
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lecting the artist the audience attempts to 
discover impossibly free-floating meanings. 
(Although Hegel does not remark on the 
matter specifically, he may have in mind 
the Greek tendency to regard the plastic 
artist as a mere craftsman, inferior both be- 
cause of his manual labor and his lack of 
theoretical activity.) 
Those who refuse to accept dialectical 
accounts of historical matters may plausibly 
claim that the artist might not reflect, but 
proceed indefinitely to create works which 
he would reject if he ever were in a more 
reflective mood. Now Hegel will probably 
agree that such an unreflective continua- 
tion would be logically possible. What he 
would insist on are: (1) since the artist is 
a self-conscious agent, there is an intrinsic 
probability that such reflection will occur at 
some point in the practice of art, and 
(2) despite the possibility of repeating 
poorly conceived attempts indefinitely, once 
critical reflection intervenes the proble- 
matics of the situation and the nature of 
self-consciousness allow us to observe the 
rational nature of the criticism and the 
resulting modification of the initial inten- 
tion. These are the crucial aspects of Hegel's 
analysis, not simply of art, but of the vari- 
ous attitudes of mind which he traces 
throughout the Phenomenology, and they 
help explain the interplay of contingent 
and rational factors in his account of hu- 
man activity. 
Hegel brings out the incoherence of ab- 
stract art by noting the opposition of its 
internal and external sides. For a work to 
be meaningful and significant it must have 
an "inner" or intentional meaning of its 
own. Yet abstract works are "external" 
insofar as they give the impression of being 
relatively independent objects or surfaces. 
For both artist and audience, the completed 
work is unhappily externalized: for the 
artist, because it is radically unlike his own 
activity, and, for the audience, because it 
cannot serve as the basis of the inner mean- 
ing which they wish to discover in it. The 
upshot is the discovery by the artist that 
"the work is, therefore, not by itself really 
an animated thing; it is a whole only when 
its process of coming to be is taken along 
with it." 4 Even this restriction must be 
strengthened; for Hegel's full analysis re- 
quires that the satisfactory work is one 
whose reception or understanding must also 
be "taken along with it." 
The unhappiness and disappointment 
produced by abstract art suggest the peren- 
nial problems of false understanding which 
provoke philosophical reflections on in- 
tention and interpretation. In this sense 
there are some significant analogies between 
Hegel's sense of "abstract" art and the more 
modern use of the term; and recent minimal 
art seems to be a paradigm case of what 
Hegel has in mind. For the latter reduces 
art to its minimal abstract or formal situa- 
tion, inviting speculation about how such 
a skeletal structure can support the flesh 
of meaning. The audience's joy in such a 
work rings false to the artist for, as Hegel 
says, he sees that it has overlooked "the pain 
of his self-discipline and the pain of pro- 
duction, . . . the exertion and strain of his 
own toil." 5 
The key to Hegel's analysis is the view 
that the history of art exhibits a rational 
development which aims at overcoming the 
incoherence of its abstract form. This 
orientation gives his account of certain art- 
forms an apparently schematic structure. 
Yet this structure is derived from the three 
components of the artistic situation- the 
artist, the work, and the audience. Even 
within abstract art, which is dominated by 
the work or the objective point of view, 
Hegel discerns the hymn and the cult as 
alternative ways of resolving the problem 
of artistic meaning. The lack of explicit 
self-consciousness in these forms, however, 
lays them open to the same objections as 
sculpture. Hegel distinguishes two other 
major artistic modes in addition to the 
abstract; these are living and spiritual art. 
Their general structure derives from art's 
aim at a totality which will include a work 
to mediate between artist's intention and 
audience's interpretation. Such mediation 
occurs in a paradigmatic fashion when, as 
in art-religion, the object of artistic produc- 
tion is insight into self-consciousness. For 
the general form and phases of the solution 
can then be anticipated: the self-conscious 
26 
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artist attempts in his work to exhibit the 
general nature of self-consciousness to an 
audience which is also self-conscious. As the 
object of art becomes increasingly self- 
conscious, the boundaries between it and 
the artist or audience tend to dissolve. 
Hegel himself points to this, somewhat 
enigmatically, when he says: 
As the work comes closer to itself in the coming 
together of its aspects, there comes about thereby 
at the same time the other fact, that the work 
comes closer to the self-consciousness performing 
it, and that the latter attains in the work knowl- 
edge of itself as it truly is.6 
B. The living work of art. 
Since the abstract work of art is handi- 
capped by the sheerly external nature of 
the art-work, the artist can be tempted to 
collapse the distinction between himself 
and the object. He does this simply by 
shaping himself into an aesthetic object. 
What he does or is is the work of art. The 
strangeness in Hegel's own time of counting 
a Bacchic revel or the Olympic games as 
works of art has largely vanished in an 
artistic world filled with happenings, living 
theater, and various more or less bizzare 
ways in which the artist becomes his own 
exhibit. In the Bacchic revel, as conceived 
both by Hegel and its modern practitioners, 
there is an indulgence in unrestricted, spon- 
taneous feeling which is also represented 
as an identity with the gods (or, in modern 
language, participation in a higher state of 
consciousness). By assuming the role of 
artistic object, the artists or performers have 
in fact liberated themselves from thle con- 
straints of form and the discipline of artistic 
work. What they mean is just what they 
do; it requires neither to be thought out 
nor to be interpreted from their works. 
However, this apparent liberation is not as 
complete as it claims to be; because its 
content is immediate natural enthusiasm 
it is subject to the instability of all un- 
objectified feeling. While performing, the 
artists are filled with meaning (which they 
take to be divine) but to a spectator (or to 
themselves, wlhen the mood has passed) the 
meaning is not apparent. Like the naive 
advocate of sense-certainty who thinks of a 
27 
"now" or a "here" as the fullest possible 
meaning, the art of emotional celebration 
passes from imagined fullness to abysmal 
emptiness as soon as it ceases to be 
immediate. 
If stability of meaning cannot be reached 
this way, however, it may possibly be gained 
by importing some regularity and balance 
into the activity of the subjective artist. 
He now sees that his activity "must produce 
a work which confronts it as the statue 
stands over against the enthusiasm of the 
artist in the previous case." However, in 
the subjective (or "living") mode of art 
which is now operative this work cannot 
be a lifeless statue but "man . . . himself as 
the figure elaborated and moulded for per- 
fectly free movement."7 We might think 
here not only of the Olympic games but of 
various (choreographed) forms of dance. 
The problem with both forms of subjective 
art is that they exhibit a dialectic like that 
found in the objective phase. Each variety 
aims at a kind of wholeness or totality of 
meaning. But by placing himself directly 
in tlhe position of the art-work the artist 
must end either in a purely transient activ- 
ity or as a beautiful, but detached object. 
Each is a one-sided parody of the life of 
mind which involves both movement and 
rest. The artist must find a way of objec- 
tifying self-consciousness (which the revel 
fails to do) while not losing the self- 
consciousness of the object (as does the 
game or dance). Hegel analyzes both the 
problem and its solution in an important 
passage which describes both the last pos- 
sible form of living art and the minimal 
conception of spiritual art: 
In the case of the Bacchic revelling enthusiasm 
the self is beside itself; in bodily beauty of 
form it is spiritual being that is outside itself. 
The dim obscurity of consciousness in the one 
case and its wild stammering utterance, must 
be taken up into the transparent existence of 
the latter, and the clear but spiritless form of 
the latter into the emotional inwardness of the 
former. The perfect element in which the in- 
wardness is as external as the externality is 
inward, is once again language.8 
Language is a uniquely privileged medium, 
according to Hegel, because it resolves the 
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tension of internal meaning and external 
vehicle which until now has sabotaged all 
of the artist's efforts to produce a totality 
of meaning. Here Hegel is considering not 
the emotional expression of the hymn, or 
the cryptic utterance of the oracle, but the 
clear, universal, and deliberately employedl 
language of the poet. The poet says just 
what he means and he does so in a series 
of words which can be repeated and exam- 
ined. Language is an external embodiment 
of internal meaning which obviously sug- 
gests a speaker and at least a potential 
listener. Language cannot be mistaken for 
an independently existing object, as can 
the statue, or for a mindless performance, 
as can the movements of the dancer or 
gymnast. It offers the possibility of an 
identity of meaning in artist, work, and 
audience, for thought and understanding 
are their expression in speech; they are not, 
as in the previous forms of art, conceived 
of as peripherally attached to the work 
from different directions by artist and 
audience. 
At the same time, the introduction of 
language also does away with some of the 
exclusively national or ethnic characteristics 
which tend to make works of art idiosyn- 
cratic or esoteric. Statues, for example, must 
represent certain physical types; but in 
using language (assumed to be translatable 
and not merely a dialect), art has "laid 
aside the particular impressions, the special 
tones and chords of that nature which it, 
as the actual spirit of the nation includes."'9 
Hegel does not mean to suggest that all 
traces of particularity are destroyed in lin- 
guistic art, but rather that the search for a 
totality of meaning will tend to give up 
those specific and particular aspects of art 
which are restrictive of universal meaning. 
If Hegel is right, then he has answered the 
criticism that lie has falsely generalized 
from a particular artistic tradition. For he 
is attempting to show that the particular 
aims and clharacteristics of Greek art are 
such that they have, when pursued, the 
dialectical consequence of raising them- 
selves to universality. It is not simply a 
fact, for Hegel, as it was for many of his 
contemporaries, that Greek art Ilad a uni- 
SHAP I RO 
versal appeal; rather its history itself ex- 
hibits a rational development toward such 
universality. 
C. The spiritual work of art. 
In terms of the dialectic of intention 
and interpretation, the special importance 
which Hegel attaches to the spiritual work 
of art should be clear. The poetry he has 
in mind is that in which the three elements 
of the artistic situation, i.e., the artist, the 
work, and the audience are all distinctively 
self-conscious. The middle term of this re- 
lationship now consists in the depiction or 
performance of human actions. A poet uses 
the self-conscious medium of language and 
creates images of human action to an audi- 
ence who can (and ultimately will) suc- 
ceed in partially identifying themselves 
with both poet and characters. Because 
there is no premature attempt to collapse 
artist's meaning and audience's understand- 
ing into an intuitive or emotional unity, 
this identity is stable and articulate; it is 
a developed and structured identity which 
Hegel in his Logic calls the "true" identity 
as distinct from the trivial identity of a 
physical object, event, or feeling with 
itself. 10 
Hegel is claiming that art can find a 
solution to the problem of artistic meaning 
and understanding. Our own experience of 
literary art and criticism, lhowever, may 
lead us to wonder whether in fact this solu- 
tion is excessively formalistic. For although 
it seems to outline a way in which artistic 
meaning can overcome the apparent dichot- 
omy of intention and interpretation, we all 
know that literary works are notoriously 
subject to divergent interpretations; and 
works of literary art have been the para- 
digm cases in modern disputes about the 
"intentional fallacy" or in discussions of 
the "hermeneutic circle." Hegel, as I under- 
stand him, would not deny any of this. 
His point is not that all which we call 
poetry is specially suited to overcome the 
problems of authorial intention and multi- 
ple meaning, but that within poetry a way 
of dissolving such problems arises out of 
poetry's own goals and materials. Two con- 
siderations make this view somewhat plau- 
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sible: (1) Hegel has in mind poetry which 
is quite clearly addressed to an audience; 
he is excluding at this point the esoteric 
hymns and oracles which purport to be 
sheer communions with or reports from the 
gods. The dyadic structure of such poetry 
makes it merely "abstract" and not "spirit- 
ual" art. (2) It may be that literary works 
figure so prominently in discussions of 
artistic meaning and criteria of interpreta- 
tion precisely because, while they promise 
more articulate significance than do visual 
or musical works, we are puzzled to encoun- 
ter problems of meaning even in their case. 
The way in which Hegel presents the 
varieties of poetry shows his intention to 
demonstrate that poetry can in fact attain 
a totality of meaning as opposed to simply 
aiming at it. Like the other forms of art, 
poetry realizes itself through a series of 
progressively more complex and adequate 
forms. In the epic, it is a communication 
by a singer to an audience by means of 
represented human actions. Yet at such a 
minimal level the poet will continue to 
think of true self-consciousness as bound 
up with the gods. So in effect tlhe human 
characters of the epic form the "middle 
term" of two "syllogisms." They connect 
mere humans (the epic singer and his audi- 
ence) with the gods by means of their 
heroic extraordinary nature (as in the Iliad 
such heroes are typically of at least par- 
tially divine descent). They also connect 
the understanding of the audience with the 
poet's intention. To the extent that the 
content of the epic involves a different kind 
of mediating (between human and divine) 
tlhan does its form (between human and 
human) it will exhibit inconsistencies which 
show that it is not a fully adequate way of 
realizing the totality of artistic meaning. 
Far from being an uncritical admirer of 
Greek art, Hegel's critique of Homer's in- 
consistencies is more radical than Socrates' 
charges of poetic ignorance or second-level 
imitating. The key to the inconsistencies 
lies in the fact that humans must act in the 
epic, suggesting that human activity is not 
simply an accessory instrument in clarify- 
ing the nature of thinigs but part of that 
very nature. This emphasis on action de- 
29 
feats the purpose of the epic "syllogism" 
which is supposed to mediate between hu- 
man and divine self-consciousness. For the 
singer represents himself as passively in- 
spired by the Muse and does not look at 
his own activity as genuine work. While 
the singer acts without seeming to, the gods 
seem to act but are in fact the butts of an 
unconscious comedy. The gods are the os- 
tensible agents of the epic with control over 
earthly events; yet this condition renders 
their often frantic concern for the doings of 
humans unintelligible. The gods exert 
themselves over what they might perform 
without effort and they rely on humans to 
give them an occupation and diversion. It 
is the gods who are actually dependent on 
humans. The gods also retain the duality 
of particularity and universality which has 
been prominent in the preceding dialectic 
of art. On the one hand they are universal 
self-consciousness, free of ordinary human 
constraints; on the other they have a spe- 
cific identity or character which links them 
with specific inclinations toward love or 
violence, for example. Thus the gods stand 
in a "relation to others, which, in virtue of 
the opposition it involves, is one of strife, 
is a comic self-forgetfulness of their eternal 
nature."11 Artistically the epic recognizes 
this by introducing fate which is an "un- 
intelligible void" to which the gods "stand 
related selfless and sorrowing, for these 
determinate natures do not find themselves 
in this purely formal necessity."12 
There is an intricate process of reduplica- 
tion occurring at this point in the Phe- 
nomenology: the unhappy consciousness 
previously attributed to men unsuccessfully 
seeking union with the divine has been in- 
ternalized by the gods themselves. As hu- 
mans become more conscious of themselves 
through artistic presentations of the gods 
the latter are fated to travel that "highway 
of despair" from which the humans are 
emerging. Hegel indicates that the epic 
singer is in some ways superior to the gods 
by pointing out that whereas the singer's 
task is recollection (Erinnerung) the gods 
are comically self-forgetful. Recollection or 
re-internalization is in fact the fundamental 
principle of the Phenomenology. By this 
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process of internalization what is otherwise 
external, abstract, and fragmentary is in- 
corporated into a developing totality of 
meaning. The epic poet is perhaps the first 
figure in the dialectical progression of the 
work who is not only an object of that prin- 
ciple but a user of it. In contrast with the 
abstract artist who has unhappily exter- 
nalized himself, the epic poet has begun the 
task of recapturing what has been estranged. 
Nevertheless, the epic poet, typically in- 
voking the Muses to speak through him is 
not fully aware of his own power. The iden- 
tity of meaning which poetry is formally 
capable of can be better realized in tragedy 
which makes the tragic actor into a kind of 
poet. In tragedy the action of the hero is 
combined with the formative power of the 
poet in the person of the tragic actor. The 
artist is no longer merely implicit in the 
work: tragic actors do not reproduce com- 
mon or externally conceived human actions 
but "they are artists" who " make the very 
inner being external."13 Hegel seems to be 
stressing the fact that the tragic characters 
appear as artistic shapers of their own lives; 
they have their own aesthetic sense of what 
constitutes a glorious or heroic life which 
appears in all their actions and words. Even 
when overtaken by calamity they rise supe- 
rior to it by giving it a poetic meaning, 
often by the use of highly charged meta- 
phorical language and extended images in 
the most desperate circumstances.14 
The self-conscious artist takes his own 
activity more and more explicitly as a 
model for humanity in general. The self- 
knowledge of the tragic artist is logically 
prior to the Aristotelian "imitation of hu- 
man action." However, the tragic actor 
does not yet stand in a coherent relation- 
ship to the chorus or audience and the gods. 
The chorus, which shares the audience's 
spectatorial attitude toward the heroic ac- 
tion, is still infected with passivity in the 
fact of the unfolding dramatic action; for 
it, the dialectical reversals of the action 
provoke pity and fear. These emotions are 
the defects of tragedy (and not, as Aristotle 
would have it, part of its characteristic vir- 
tue), for they reveal the persistence of an 
unhappy consciousness which confronts the 
objective world as something overpowering 
and frustrating. These emotions are signs 
of a failure of understanding which even 
the artist-heroes are unable to overcome. 
The persistence of the gods in tragedy is 
an indication that the other two elements 
in the artistic triad are also incompletely 
self-conscious and so contribute to tragedy's 
inconsistencies. The tragic hero's problem 
is itself one of knowledge and ignorance; in 
a world divided into two parts he is fully 
aware only of one, and therefore even his 
self-knowledge is deficient. Here's Hegel's 
well-known analysis of the social structure 
of the tragic world comes into play. The 
tragic world is that of customary morality 
raised to self-consciousness; it exhibits the 
conflict of the human law of the state and 
the divine law of family obligation on the 
level of knowledge. In Antigone it is the 
clash of the two moral tendencies, each 
having its own justification, which repre- 
sents the moral dilemma of the ancient 
world. In his analysis of tragedy (as op- 
posed to that of Sittlichkeit) Hegel is inter- 
ested in the cognitive problems of the actors 
in this moral conflict. Their ignorance is 
not a merely human failing (an Aristotelian 
flaw or error) but is produced by the de- 
ceptive pronouncements of the gods. (Ap- 
pollo, the god of light, leads Orestes and 
Oedipus into darkness by his obscure pro- 
nouncements.) In this context, the heart of 
tragedy is failure of self-knowledge due to 
the persistence of nature in customary 
morality and the incompleteness of the art- 
ist's effort to rescue self-consciousness from 
its objectification in the gods. Tragedy 
shows the partiality of the various divine 
powers and their reconciliation through 
death or absolution, suggesting that only 
the totality of these powers is real. Con- 
ceptually understood this is the notion 
(Begriff); artistically, it is Zeus as a sole 
deity who has shed some of his anthropo- 
morphic traits. The gods themselves do 
not generally appear on the tragic stage and 
so Hegel can claim in a double sense that 
tragedy "completes the depopulation of 
heaven." Hegel is saying, in effect, that 
Plato was right in pointing out the incon- 
sistent role of the gods in epic and tragic 
30 
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poetry but that he failed to notice that "the 
expulsion of such unreal insubstantial ideas 
. . . demanded by the philosophers of an- 
tiquity, thus already has its beginning in 
tragedy in general."15 
The abstract necessity of tragedy is also 
still external to the tragic actors. They dis- 
close a kinship with the passive chorus: on 
the one hand they are moments in the prog- 
ress of the notion, but on the other they are 
human beings playing a part. The object 
in the artistic triad which had apparently 
dropped out, leaving a direct relation be- 
tween actors and audience, reappears: "The 
hero, who appears before the onlookers, 
breaks up into his mask and the actor into 
the person of the play and the actual self."'l6 
So tragedy repeats the problem of the 
statue at a more complex level: the original 
trichotomy of artist, work, and audience 
re-emerges in such a way that the self- 
consciousness of the different elements is 
distinct and art still fails at its task. 
The need for a new form of art at this 
point should be evident, and the problems 
of tragedy indicate the general character 
which it will have: 
The self-consciousness of the heroes must step 
forth from its mask and be represented as 
knowing itself to be the fate both of the gods 
of the chorus and of the absolute powers them- 
selves, and as being no longer separated from 
the chorus, the universal consciousness.17 
That is, the new form of art will do for the 
relation between art-work and audience 
what tragedy has done for that between the 
artist and his work. Tragedy makes the 
hero himself into an artist; comedy, the 
ultimate type of art-religion, breaks down 
the separation between such artist-heroes 
and their audience. The clear content of 
comedy is the identity of human self- 
consciousness in each aspect of the artistic 
triad, attained by eliminating the kind of 
role which the gods play in the preceding 
art-forms; since human self-consciousness is 
no longer seen in such externalized form 
the audience of art can see itself in the 
work as does the artist who creates artistic 
characters in his own image. While tragedy 
reduces the divine pantheon to the single 
distant figure of Zeus, comedy dethrones 
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even him, and the vortex reigns in his 
place. The general spirit of comedy is a 
relentless turning of the negative power of 
mind against anything which appears to be 
fixed and substantial. Along with the gods, 
the leaders of society, the philosophers, and 
the notions of a substantial good and 
beauty are represented as superficial, imagi- 
nary, or mere abstractions. 
What particularly defines comedy, how- 
ever, is the unparalleled "state of spiritual 
good health" in which all of these negations 
occur.18 For the spirit of comedy is to re- 
joice in the destruction and dissolution of 
all the elements of tradition and custom 
which it negates. In this respect it is the 
antithesis of what Hegel calls the unhappy 
consciousness: the latter is aware of itself as 
self-conscious mind, but is embittered by 
its sense of being radically separated from 
a stable and divine self which seems to 
exist quite independently. The unhappy 
consciousness turns its negative power 
within, supposing the impregnability of 
what is external to it. In comedy self- 
consciousness sees itself as being all that 
there is after its negative power has over- 
come what was apparently external. In this 
self-recognition the attitude of artist, art- 
work (or character), and audience reach a 
happy union. The puzzles of meaning 
which characterize the other forms of art 
are no longer present. The comic character 
cannot be sharply distinguished from the 
comic actor (as could the corresponding 
pair in tragedy) because both exercise the 
power of ridicule and each laughs at him- 
self as well as the world. The actor is free 
to drop his mask because he stands in no 
danger of being severed from his persona. 
Similarly, the audience is no longer passive 
but participates in the process of negation, 
even if it is alternately the object as well as 
the subject of laughter. In logical terms, 
necessity, which appears in the enigmatic 
form of fate in epic and tragedy, has be- 
come incorporated into self-consciousness 
which now sees itself as both agent and 
spectator, subject to no external force. 
In the context of the problems of artistic 
meaning which we have been pursuing, 
comedy marks a culminating stage. The 
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sense which artist and audience have of the 
art-work is precisely the same here, and it 
is so because each finds itself in the mediat- 
ing element of the comic actor. Significantly 
the dispensability of the comedian's mask 
shows that the middle term here both is 
and is not an intervening element. In a 
formal sense it occupies the same position 
as the abstract statue. Yet the mask can be 
dropped, so as to eliminate any barrier to 
identity with the audience. Hegel enforces 
the point by means of a supreme pun: 
The religion of art is fulfilled and consummated 
in [comedy] and has come full circle . . . the 
genuine self of the actor (Schauspieler) coin- 
cides with his persona or mask (Persotn), just 
as the onlooker (Zuschauer) is perfectly at home 
in what is represented before him.l9 
This may be one of Hegel's most accessible 
presentations of his notion of identity-in- 
difference. It is a significant point in the 
larger development of his Phenomenology 
which has as its aim the discovery of a form 
of mind in which the distinction between 
what an attitude or form of consciousness 
is in its own eyes and in the eyes of a wise 
observer (what it is for-itself and what it is 
for-us) collapses. What emerges finally is 
a kind of absolute subject or privileged 
"we" which knows that it has realized ex- 
actly what it has aimed at. Within the 
more limited context set by the problem of 
artistic meaning we might note that Schau 
or show (appearance, presentation) is the 
medium of art, as distinguished from the 
more purely conceptual activity of philoso- 
phy. Art realizes its aim when one who 
plays at or puts on this show is no longer 
clearly distinct from one who watches the 
show. That Hegel takes this development 
from abstract art to comedy to be paradig- 
matic for all art is confirmed by the fact 
that his later Lectures on Fine Art also end 
with comedy. There he makes it an essen- 
tial characteristic of great comedy that the 
comic characters laugh at themselves as well 
as being laughable; that is, they share the 
attitude of the artist and the audience.20 
It has not always been noted that in Hegel's 
two major treatments of art comedy is the 
supreme or culminating form of art. The 
belief that he gave some special priority to 
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tragedy still seems to be prevalent; in fact 
he has attempted to show that tragedy is 
an incoherent effort to establish a totality 
of artistic meaning. If the preceding analy- 
sis is correct, Hegel has given what amounts 
to a transcendental deduction of comedy as 
the only possible way of overcoming the 
dichotomies posed by our experience of 
artistic intentions and interpretations. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH IDENTITY 
Hegel has told a story about art which 
claims much but is apparently open to 
objections of several sorts. If viewed as a 
history of Greek art, it is undoubtedly 
highly schematic and arbitrary; while as a 
philosophical theory about art in general it 
seems unduly limited by the specific char- 
acteristics of Greek art. Such objections are 
variations of the venerable criticism that 
Hegel's Phenomenology exhibits a systematic 
confusion between history and transcenden- 
tal psychology. Hegel's own style does not 
always help to clarify the situation, and 
English readers are not well-served by an 
edition which, by means of footnotes and 
critical introductions, makes Hegel appear 
to be more interested in historical detail 
than does the unvarnished text. Apparently 
Hegel (along with Schelling, Marx, and 
Nietzsche) saw Greek art as more than just 
the product of a particular culture. What 
lends it a universal significance is the fact 
that, as Hegel elaborates in his lectures on 
fine art, it tends to find the perfect fusion 
of spiritual content with sensuous form. 
Modern works of art may be richer in spir- 
itual meaning, but tend to drop their con- 
nection with the sensuous. Hegel is also in 
good company in viewing Greek culture as 
itself fundamentally artistic insofar as it 
exemplifies the emergence of spirit out of 
its natural surroundings. Plato's apparently 
extravagant complaints about the pervasive 
effects of art (if not his analysis of the 
alleged destructive nature of these effects) 
become more plausible on this view. More- 
over, Hegel gives us an analysis which pur- 
ports to show how Greek art itself makes 
the transition from its more particular to 
its more universal phases: this development 
occurs precisely because of the artist's need 
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to eliminate the gaps between himself, his 
work, and his audience. What is peculiar 
about Greek art, Hegel might say, is not the 
presence of this problem and its solution, 
but the direct and concentrated manner in 
which it advanced from one to the other 
until it dissolved itself in laughter. 
Yet Greek art, in Hegel's presentation, 
seems tied to a highly specific religious in- 
terest. To regard religious art as the pat- 
tern of all art seems patently absurd if one 
has any talent at all for imagining counter- 
examples. Nevertheless, I believe Hegel can 
be defended here. Hegel pictures the 
Greek artist as the inventor of the gods, as 
Herodotus regarded Homer and Hesiod. 
These gods are artistic gods; they serve the 
artist's need to create an image of pure or 
perfect self-consciousness. As soon as he 
begins to work with them, they lose their 
external and particular forms, while the 
artist sees that what he was seeking is in 
fact exemplified in his own activity. The 
religion in art-religion must be conceived 
not only in terms of its more or less arbi- 
trary origins, but also in relation to its 
self-clarifying purpose which eventually 
celebrates the death of the gods and the 
human assumption of their place. Althouglh 
from a Marxist or Nietzschean perspective 
this may appear as a crass justification of 
the bourgeois artist and his audience, Hegel 
would claim that such criticism depends on 
reading back into art-religion that particu- 
larity which it is in the process of tran- 
scending. In fact the religious aspect of this 
art, which allows it to serve as a paradigm 
for art in general, consists in its exhibition of 
the universal pattern of Hegelian reflection. 
A;iming at the truth or the essence of things, 
we tend to find it first in an apparently 
independent object; reflection forces us to 
an awareness of our own self-consciousness; 
but the problematic situation of self- 
consciousness, when confronted with an 
external object leads it to seek another 
which is truly its own. When such reflec- 
tion occurs in art, the result can be viewed 
in the language of aesthetics as the identity 
of intention and interpretation; in Hegel's 
own terminology, the purpose which was at 
first merely implicit (an sich), altlhough it 
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had a significance for us (fiir-uns), has be- 
come aware of itself (fiir-sich). 
In this paper I have not attempted to 
evaluate Hegel's conception of artistic 
meaning. Instead I have suggested that he 
provides a brilliant solution to some of the 
dilemmas concerning intention and inter- 
pretation in art which have bedeviled mod- 
ern aesthetics; to speak more strictly, he 
claims (in a more modest vein) to have 
shown that art itself is beset by these di- 
lemmas and can offer solutions to them. 
That such solutions will exhaust the re- 
sources of art (and of a certain kind of 
religion) is one of the melancholy ironies 
so typical of his philosophy. To evaluate 
Hegel's view we would need to go beyond 
his analysis of art or art-religion and criti- 
cally confront his conception of conscious- 
ness. Here the major problems bearing on 
the area we have been examining can at 
least be pointed out. They stem from two 
very central Hegelian claims (perhaps they 
are assumptions of his system): (1) every 
significant human activity tends to pass into 
the theory of that activity, the theory into 
meta-theory, and so on; (2) the overriding 
aim of consciousness is to reach an identity 
with its object; it will never be satisfied 
with any lesser degree of relatedness. The 
first principle leads to the incorporation of 
the problems of aesthetics into the activity 
of the artist. The second principle issues 
in the view that artists and audiences will 
be unhappy unless their understandings of 
art-works are completely identical. As in 
the more recent expressionistic theories of 
Croce and Collingwood this leads to the 
insistence that the art-work itself be simply 
a thought, feeling, or intuition; its appar- 
ently independent status must be undercut. 
Of these two principles, the first can prob- 
ably be accepted with some qualification. 
There seems to be an ineradicable tendency 
for mind to reflect on its own activities, 
even if there are countless cases in which 
this tendency is not actualized. Yet in order 
for Hegel to establish that there is a logic 
of reflection in art (or other areas) which 
will lead to the kinds of conclusions he 
sketches, he requires his second principle. 
Here it seems to be plausible that we can 
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accept relations short of identity, and even 
prefer them to identity. To care truly for 
another person I need not be that other 
person; if I am, the structure of caring will 
be destroyed. In art the artist may aim at 
making something quite other than his own 
activity and those who care for art may find 
part of the value of that caring just in the 
independence and differences of the art- 
object.21 It may be that Hegel has correctly 
found the clue to one strand in the history 
of art; accordingly, it is not surprising if 
phases of abstract, minimal art are chal- 
lenged by varieties of living art and these 
finally overcome by a clearly meaningful 
poetry. Yet alongside such histories we may 
also expect to find artists who continue to 
be concerned with shaping external mate- 
rials and audiences for art who care for the 
things made and exhibited without seeking 
to incorporate them into themselves.22 
1 1 have tried to spell out some of this structure 
in "Intention and Interpretation: a Semiotic Analy- 
sis." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
(Fall, 1974). 
2 For Collingwood's distinction between art and 
craft, see his The Principles of Art (New York, 
1958), pp. 15-41. 
3 Perhaps some justification is necessary for 
treating Hegel's chapter on Kunstreligion from the 
standpoint of art, and not primarily as a phase 
of religion. In the structure of the Phenomen- 
ology, Kunstreligion is intermediate between the 
transcendent religion of light and Christianity. In 
this perspective, Hegel is clearly articulating a tri- 
adic structure of transcendent, immanent, and then 
immanent and transcendent religions. J. N. Findlay, 
in his Hegel: A Re-Examination (New York, 1962) 
classifies Kunstreligion as one form of "Pre-Chris- 
tian Religion" while admitting that it "is as much 
a treatment of Greek art and literature as of 
Greek religion" (p. 134). Emile Fackenheim also 
stresses the religious aspect of the chapter, seeing 
it as the story of a religion which gains presence 
for its divinities at the cost of sacrificing their 
depth. Cf. The Religious Dimension in Hegel's 
Thought (Boston, 1970), p. 55. The religious orien- 
tation of Hegel's analysis is clearly important. 
However, the chapter itself is about art-religion, 
not simply religion. As I hope to make plausible 
in the text Hegel presents the mental activity in 
question as attempting to resolve problems which 
in recent years have been regarded as mainly 
aesthetic or artistic. When keeping the larger 
context of Hegel's argument in mind, it should 
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not be forgotten that no form of religion is the 
culmination of the Phenomenology but the state 
which Hegel calls Absolute Knowledge. As an 
approximation to this state, art-religion comes close 
to realizing the general cognitive end of a meaning 
whose purpose is completely fulfilled and in which 
separations between intention and interpretation 
are dissolved. A thorough justification of my 
own emphasis in reading the chapter would re- 
quire a more explicit study of the role of art and 
the aesthetic in Hegel's philosophy than has yet 
appeared; in the meantime I hope that the strik- 
ing similarity between Hegel's formulation and 
contemporary discussions warrants such a reading. 
4G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind 
(Phen.), translated by J. B. Baillie. (New York, 
1961), p. 715; Phanomenologie des Geistes, Hoff- 
meister edition (H.), p. 495. 
'Phen., p. 716; H., p. 495. 
Phen., p. 705; H., p. 487. 
7Phen., p. 728; H., pp. 504-505. 
'Phen., p. 729; H., p. 505. 
Phen., p. 730; H., p. 506. 
19Logic, paragra,ph 115. 
"Phen., p. 735; H., p. 509. 
"Phen., p. 735; H., p. 510. 
13Phen., p. 737; H., p. 511. 
14 Cf. Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 
translated by T. M. Knox (London, 1975), vol. I, 
pp. 416-421. Except in this case, Hegel takes meta- 
phor and symbolism to be inadequate modes for 
poetry because they merely suggest ambiguous 
meaning rather than expressing dialectical content, 
as does the best poetry. I have explored the con- 
trast between dialectical and symbolic meaning in 
"Hegel on the Meanings of Poetry," Philosophy 
and Rhetoric, Spring, 1975. 
"Phen., p. 743; H., p. 516. 
'6Phen., p. 745; H., p. 517. The frequent praise 
and criticism of Hegel's "theory" of tragedy have 
led to some neglect of this section of his Phenom- 
enology, which attempts to demonstrate the in- 
consistency of the tragic form. In a recent essay, 
Walter Kaufmann has offered a healthy corrective 
to this tradition by claiming that Hegel has no 
theory of tragedy; apparently in opposition to A. 
C. Bradley's famous "'Hegel's Theory of Tragedy," 
Kaufmann calls his essay "Hegel's Ideas About 
Tragedy." Cf. Warren Steinkraus, ed. New Studies 
in Hegel's Philosophy (New York, 1971), esp. pp. 
201 and 211. Kaufmann's denial is useful in re- 
minding us that Hegel has no independent theory 
of tragedy as such; the reason for this, however, 
does not seem to be Hegel's alleged empiricism 
which would prevent him from subsuming the 
facts of tragedy under any "Procrustean" theory. 
It is rather that Hegel in each of the places 
where he writes or talks about tragedy has some 
more general philosophical end than defining a 
literary genre. It is not that Hegel abandons an 
interest in theory to an absorption in the variety 
of the facts (although Hegel's respect for the 
contingent and empirical is often neglected), but 
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that his theoretical interests have to do with how 
art can approach the goal of Absolute Knowledge. 
In general, there is a need for greater attention to 
the systematic context of Hegel's utterances about 
art. For example, Kaufmann cites as the "fatal 
flaw" of Hegel's treatment of tragedy the view 
that every tragedy involves two equally justified 
sides. The Hegelian text which most closely sup- 
ports such a view is the treatment of customary 
morality (Sittlichkeit) in the Phenomenology. 
Hegel uses Antigone to throw light on the con- 
tradictions of a certain ethical-social arrangement. 
But here Hegel's subject is not tragedy as such, 
but tragedy as illustlrative of ethical-social prob- 
lems! When he considers tragedy in the chapter 
on Kunstreligion it is the problems of tragic 
knowledge and the incoherence of the actors' role 
with which he is concerned. 
"Phen., p. 745; H., p. 517. 
18 Phen., p. 749; H., p. 520. 
19Phen., p. 748; H., p. 520. (I have slightly 
altered Baillie's translation.) Findlay stresses the 
sense of loss and the reappearance of the unhappy 
consciousness in comedy (Hegel: A Re-examination, 
p. 137). Yet, given Hegel's dialectic, it is also in 
keeping for him to describe the comic attitude as 
an "unparalleled state of spiritual good health" 
and to have consistent praise for Aristophanes. 
Jacob Loewenberg is the only Hegel scholar I 
have encountered who consistently sees that there 
is a very important sense in which, for Hegel, 
comedy is a deeper form of art than tragedy. He 
has also suggested that the comic complacency in 
the face of contradiction and dissolution is very 
close both to the spirit of Hegel's dialectic and to 
the procedure of the Phenomenology in particu- 
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lar. See Hegel's Phenomenology (LaSalle, Illinois, 
1965), pp. 326-333, esp. 331-2. 
20 Hegel's Aesthetics, vol. II, pp. 1233-1236. 
There are major differences in the scope and 
organization of Hegel's chapter on Kunstreligion 
and his later and long course of lectures. How- 
ever, it seems to me that the relatively schematic 
dialectical structure of the Kunstreligion chapter 
supplies a crucial perspective on the argument of 
the lectures. The latter, encompassing as they do 
the art of the Oriental world, Greece, Rome, the 
middle ages, and modern times, are filled with 
empirical detail. It may also have happened that 
some of Hegel's argument has been lost in the 
course of transcription by his students. So despite 
the great wealth of its contents, the following con- 
clusion of the lectures may appear to be obscure 
unless it is supplemented by attending to Hegel's 
account of the problems of intention and inter- 
pretation in the Phenomenology: 
Comedy leads at the same time to the dissolu- 
tion of art altogether. All art aims at the 
identity, produced by the spirit, in which eternal 
things, God, and absolute truth are revealed in 
real appearance and shape to our contemplation, 
to our hearts allnd minds (Hegel's Aesthetics, 
vol. II, p. 1236). 
21 Cf. Albert Hofstadter's critique of Hegel's 
conception of identity in "Ownness and Identity: 
Re-thinking Hegel," Review of Metaphysics, June 
1975. 
22 Work on this paper was assisted by Kansas 
University Research Grant 3744-5038. I'm grateful 
to the editor and referee of this journal for some 
helpful suggestions. 
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